This paper draws on the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias in understanding the current housing crisis in the UK: one which emphasizes the social interdependencies between individuals and groups, and the power relations that characterise them, in explaining household behaviour. It is argued that such an approach can contribute to a better understanding of housing processes and their differentiated outcomes. At the same time, this analysis exposes the myriad negative consequences that emerge from short-term housing policies based on static, over-simplified assumptions and applied to an ever-increasingly complex housing figuration, which is constantly in flux. These arguments are made with reference to empirical evidence on the impact of changes to Housing Benefit in the private rented sector, which shows how neoliberal housing policy contributes to long-term detrimental effects on marginalised households and groups. Through this example, it is argued that the governmental presentation of welfare reforms differs markedly from the reality of consequences on the ground and corresponds to 'neoliberal state-crafting'. It is suggested that any approach to understanding the complexities of the housing system must retain a focus on historical change, precedents and fluctuations in power balances to avoid the pernicious "retreat into the present" characteristic of policy.
Introduction
Governmental discourses on housing policy proceed as if it existed in a kind of vacuum: policymakers pull levers which precipitate desired changes in the behaviour of obediently responsive tenants, households and landlords. They present policy initiatives and their assumed outcomes in static isolation, as if wider social and historical processes were irrelevant; and as if individual actors respond directly to policy changes through a calculated (and invariably financial-centred) decision-making process which results in the desired outcomes. As such, housing policy consistently ignores the complex web of social interdependencies in which individuals and groups negotiating the housing system are enmeshed and which are constantly in flux, changing this way and that in line with fluctuations in power balances. Nowhere is this static, processreducing, behaviourist approach more apparent than in the case of the UK coalition government's Housing Benefit (HB) reforms which form a central part of the unprecedented retraction of welfare support. This paper draws on the theoretical work of Norbert Elias in taking a figurational perspective towards understanding and critiquing the governmental rationalities underpinning the cuts to Local Housing Allowance (LHA), the regime for administering HB in the private rented sector (PRS) (see Beatty et al., 2012; DWP, 2011) . Early research that has addressed the LHA reforms has tended to replicate the government position in terms of retreating into a London-centric focus (Hamnett, 2010; Fenton, 2010) , or has been guilty of an "over-critique" (Kilminster, 2013) in its exaggeration of the impact of reforms. Both positions are inadequate: the first neglects the differentiated and far-reaching impacts outside of the capital; the second closes down debate with government simply dismissing such criticisms as "scare-mongering" (Freud, 2012) . This paper seeks to bring a degree of balance to the evidence base: firstly in terms of a consideration of impacts beyond (but also including) London; and secondly through a more detached, empirical perspective which draws on qualitative evidence from landlords and housing advisers 4 dealing directly with the impact of the reforms. In doing so, it emphasises the differing effects of social processes across time and space and their relationship to, and impact on, the social interdependencies between tenants, landlords, and local and central government. This wider context is crucial to understanding the impact of the LHA changes and the particular responses of those directly affected. Key social processes relevant to the housing figuration discussed here include: deindustrialisation; globalisation; privatization; deregulation; migration; gentrification; social polarization; marginalization; disidentification; (territorial) stigmatization; and neoliberalization. 1 The paper argues that the blanket reforms to LHA are ignorant to the uneven effects of these wider social processes, which produce different responses to the LHA measures among different groups in different localities. It argues that housing policy outcomes in the PRS are increasingly unplanned and unforeseen as a result of the complexity and lengthening of social interdependencies, which serve to constrain or enable behaviour. With sensitivity to these differing contexts it argues that LHA reform only accentuates the negative processes of marginalization and stigmatization (both social and spatial) for the least powerful; detrimental processes which housing policy should be designed to counter. In this sense, the arguments presented here also speak to recent academic debates on the central role of housing in the continuation of market-based reforms to transform the state Manzi, 2013a, 2013b) .
That is, acknowledging that changes in the policy field of housing are 'part and parcel of a much wider, albeit spatially uneven, process of "neoliberalization" across the public sector, welfare provision and labour markets' (Hodkinson et al, 2012, p.6) . It therefore responds to call for a processual approach to housing which does not isolate tenures and social groups but instead considers the relationships and interdependencies between them, as well as being sensitive to the impact of wider social and historical processes on the housing field (Cole, 2006; Jacobs and Manzi, 2013a) .
The extent and scale of the changes, coupled with the uncertainty and myriad unintended consequences they bring, mean that the full impact will take considerable time to filter through the system . 2 The findings presented here therefore focus on the impacts and processes evident in the early stages of policy implementation and centre on two very different local authorities: Rhondda Cynon Taf (hereafter RCT) in South Wales; and Westminster in central London. The reforms to LHA and their specific impact within RCT and Westminster are used as an example of the inadequate and flawed nature of neoliberal housing policy here for three reasons. Firstly, the perceived need for state retrenchment in the form of LHA cuts is a direct product of the contraction of the social rented sector and PRS deregulation and therefore the current predicament -the high HB bill -is itself an outcome of the failures of neoliberal housing policy (i.e. the Right to Buy and the deregulation of rents). Secondly, the example captures the inequalities across both spaces and sections of the population which coalesce to produce and perpetuate processes of spatial and social stigmatization and marginalization. Thirdly, though emanating from central government, the immediate fallout from the reforms impinges on tenants, landlords, local communities and local authorities and therefore provides a telling example of 'neoliberal state crafting' (Wacquant, 2013a ). As we shall see, this entails, to paraphrase Nikolas Rose: a shift from an ethos of bureaucracy to the private business of the landlord; from planning and allocation to intensive competition between tenants with unequal power resources; and from the logic of the housing system to the logic of the housing market (Rose, 1999, p.150) . It is further argued that, in the case of RCT, the reforms represent a form of territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 2007) in action: a process of marginalising already stigmatized households and social groups contained within an 'area of relegation'. In this sense, what follows also responds to Wacquant's call: 2 DWP research monitoring the reforms cites a number of lagged effects in tenant and landlord responses related to: a lack of knowledge about the reforms on the part of both landlords and tenants; a nine month period of transitional protection in the implementation process for existing tenants; the use of temporary Discretionary Housing Payments (more often than not viewed by landlords and housing advisers as "delaying the inevitable"); and affected households clinging on to tenancies in a desperate bid to stay in their current property and area, which often results in increasing arrears (Beatty et al., 2012 (Wacquant, 2013a, p.9 -emphasis in original) The comparative approach adopted underscores the importance of the local housing market context in delineating the effects of the LHA cuts and the way in which they are contingent on wider social processes. The focus on Westminster in central London illustrates how longerterm processes of globalisation, in-migration and the deregulation of housing and financial markets, create the context for a distinct set of negative impacts for tenants within an area of relative affluence. While the second case study of RCT illustrates the way in which these very same processes operate differently across time and space and impinge on the ability of communities and municipal authorities to ameliorate the damaging effects of central policy (see also Cole and Furbey, 1994) . That is, in RCT globalisation has led to the deindustrialisation of the area and the selective out-migration of its residents resulting in long-term processes of economic decline, housing residualisation, marginalization and territorial stigmatization 3 (Wacquant, 2007 (Wacquant, , 2008a ; see also Hancock and Mooney, 2013) , which are accentuated rather than remedied by these reforms. Thus, though the geographical and social contexts of the two areas are poles apart, the consequences of LHA reform for the least powerful households and groups are consistently negative; yet shaped in specific ways by the context and relations in which they are embedded. The result is a dual process of the containment of marginality in spaces of relegation and its dispersal in spaces of affluence.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The first sets out the reforms to LHA focusing on the rationale for their implementation and the expected outcomes they are designed to achieve in terms of altering the behaviour of tenants and landlords in a particular direction.
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The second explores the complexities of the interdependencies which constitute the PRS through a figurational lens. The third section draws on empirical evidence from a large scale research study monitoring the impacts of the LHA reforms in order to illustrate the importance of wider social processes in determining the housing outcomes and responses of different groups. This section focuses on the two examples at either end of the spectrum of housing markets in the UK: Westminster and RCT. The fourth section discusses the findings in relation to recent debates on urban marginalization, housing marketization and neoliberalization. The paper concludes that while the reforms may produce the government's desired outcomes in some areas (see Beatty et al., 2014) , they have also set in train long-term and negative consequences which are distributed unevenly across the UK, play out in distinctly different ways, but invariably impinge on the least powerful and already marginalized.
The LHA cuts
Academic and media coverage of Housing Benefit reform has been extensive. Most prominent within these discourses are the "bedroom tax" and the overall household benefit cap. Much less attention has been paid to the reforms to LHA. This is surprising given the recent and rapid expansion of the PRS and the fact that overall cuts to LHA amount to £1.65 billion per annum nationally; in comparison to £490m for the bedroom tax and £270m for the overall benefit cap (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, p.10) . Furthermore, the LHA reforms affect 1.35m households, compared to 660,000 and 56,000 affected by the bedroom tax and the overall benefit cap, respectively (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, p.10) . The reforms to LHA, then, are a key mechanism of the government's welfare retrenchment but the marginal position of the PRS and its tenants appears to be mirrored, to some degree, in terms of the prominent discourses opposing welfare cuts.
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The stated principles guiding LHA reform are threefold: to reduce the overall HB bill and exert downward pressure on rents; to encourage tenants into work, or to work longer hours (one third of LHA tenants are already in work ); to make the HB system "fairer".
These objectives are set out within the DWP's own Impact Assessment:
'The 2011 changes to the Local Housing Allowance arrangements will both significantly reduce the levels of rent met by Housing Benefit in expensive areas and apply downward pressure on expenditure more generally. Currently, people can pay high rents in some areas because of the availability of Housing Benefit. These changes will mean that people on benefit cannot choose to live in properties that would be out of the reach of most people in work and will result in a fairer and more sustainable Housing Benefit scheme. They will also begin to address disincentives to work in the current system created by high rates of benefit. The measures will achieve cash-terms benefit savings of around £1 billion by /15' (DWP, 2010 .
In 2010/11 HB expenditure was £21.61 billion (or 14 per cent of total benefits expenditure), an increase of 5 per cent over the previous year. There are sharp regional variations however. In 2009/10, for example, London accounted for 26 per cent of all HB expenditure in Great Britain (Hull et al., 2011) . The primary reason for such rapid expenditure growth has been the rise in caseloads during and after the recession, with an increase of almost 750,000 people claiming HB between 2007/8 and 2010/11. It is important to acknowledge however, that the increasing HB bill is also a product of deregulation under the Housing Act of 1988, which formed a key part of the Thatcher government's privatisation of housing provision (Crook and Kemp, 2011) . This marked a huge shift from the previously regulated "fair rents system" to assured tenancies at market rents (see Crook and Kemp, 2011, pp.25-39) . This, along with the other key policy in that government's marketization of housing, the Right to Buy (which enabled Council tenants to purchase their own homes below market prices and served to deplete levels of social housing provision), is central to understanding the current crisis and recent rapid tenure change described below. The LHA scheme was introduced for new claimants living in the deregulated PRS in April 2008 (for detailed information on the design and workings of the LHA system see: DWP, 2011; Kemp, 2007; Crook and Kemp, 2011) . The LHA is a flat rate allowance for different 9 size of property in a Broad Rental Market Area 4 . Under the original LHA scheme, the LHA for different sizes of property was calculated by the Valuation Office Agency with reference to the median rent for that property type. The package of LHA reforms were announced by the Coalition government in its June 2010 budget (see Beatty et al., 2012 Beatty et al., , 2014 . These are: 5  Changing the basis for setting LHA rates from the median to the 30 th percentile of local market rents (i.e. effectively lowering rates from the average market rent to the lowest 30 per cent. In theory, this means that the new LHA rates will cover the rent of only 30 per cent of properties, where previously this was 50 per cent. In reality, however, the proportion of the PRS available to HB tenants is lower in both cases as many landlords express an aversion to letting to HB tenants under any circumstances (see Leaving aside the last two mitigating policy instruments cited above, despite the three different stated aims of the reforms, the policy mechanism for bringing about the desired changes in the behaviour of tenants and landlords is exactly the same: a reduction in HB entitlements. It is assumed that such a reduction will result in four possible outcomes. Either tenants will: negotiate a lower rent with their landlords; move into employment or take on extra hours; move to an area and/or property where rents are cheaper; or find the money from elsewhere (savings, borrowing or cutting back on household spending). The policy changes were announced in 2010 and aside from a desk-based impact assessment at the national scale, conducted internally by the Department for Work and Pensions, there was no official research into the likely effects of the reforms. Among those working with and for tenants, however, vociferous concerns were raised about the effects on those claimants who will not be able to "bridge the gap" between what they receive in HB and the rent charged (Beatty et al., 2012) .
The government position has remained wedded to the policy assumptions and the conclusion drawn from the impact assessment that the 'benefits of the reforms justify the costs' (DWP, 2010).
HB reforms cannot be seen in isolation from other welfare reforms taking place simultaneously. 9 The reforms to LHA are just one aspect of the unprecedented overhaul of the 8 Discretionary Housing Payments are intended to mitigate the impact on tenants and can be paid to claimants where there is a shortfall between the benefit paid and the contractual rent. Councils are expected to take into account any special circumstances facing the tenants. 9 While areas of housing policy are devolved to the Welsh Government and therefore subject to different institutional arrangements to that in England, the Welfare Reform Act applies to both nations. welfare system since the financial crisis of 2008 (see Beatty and Fothergill, 2013) In terms of the overall financial impact of welfare reform: 'as a general rule, the more deprived the local authority, the greater the financial hit' (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, p.3) . Westminster is the exception here and is second in the list of affected local authorities in terms of the overall impact of all welfare reforms by 2014/15.
Expressed as the financial loss per working age adult per annum Westminster loses £820, and is second only to Blackpool (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013) . This is because 'the Housing Benefit reforms and the household benefit cap lead to very large financial losses' but 'the impact of other welfare reforms on Westminster is far more modest' (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013, pp.14-15) . RCT comes in as the 20 th worst affected district in Great Britain with a loss of £670 per working age adult per year -a huge sum for an isolated, deindustrialised economy characterised by a long-term deficit in labour demand and low paid, insecure work. The complexities here are clear. For households who have been affected by one or more of these other welfare reform measures, it is naturally difficult for policy-makers to predict, or for researchers to disentangle, the exact impact of the changes to LHA. Moreover, the plethora of welfare reforms have been implemented against a backdrop of housing flux with the PRS growing at a rapid rate and 10 The implementation of the new Council Tax Reduction scheme was devolved to local areas and the Scottish and Welsh Governments along with 57 English districts, including Westminster, decided not to pass the reduction onto claimants. 11 Universal Credit, the government's flagship welfare reform, is not discussed here due to uncertainty and vagueness surrounding its implementation. However, the myriad problems associated with the reform testify to the disjuncture between the complex reality of housing and welfare reform and the ideological knowledge driving it. was on a par with the social rented sector, which also accounted for 17 per cent of all households -significantly below its peak of over 30 per cent in the 1980s (BSHF, 2010) . This is in contrast to trends in other western countries over the last 15 years where the PRS is stable (e.g. Germany, Norway, Sweden, US) or has continued to decline (e.g. Belgium); the exception being Australia which also shows an increase (see Scanlon, 2011; Crook and Kemp, 2014) . Table 1 below illustrates how the PRS is increasingly taking the strain of the housing crisis with a 267 per cent increase in the LHA caseload between 2008 and 2013.
Table 1 here
This shift is central to accounts of the housing marketization process (Malpass and Victory, 2010; Manzi, 2013a, 2013b) driven by the privatization of social housing through the Right to Buy (Cole and Furbey, 1994; , stock transfer (Ginsburg, 2005; Watt, 2009) , and the deregulation of housing finance (Kennett et al., 2013 
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In recent years the PRS can be characterised as an unregulated sector undergoing rapid transformation and in a state of flux 12 , all of which hampers our limited understanding and makes predicting behaviour based on static conceptions a nigh on impossible task.
One size fits all: the LHA cuts and the local context
It is instructive to consider what these blanket LHA changes mean in the context of the two different localities. Table 2 below illustrates the diversity of the PRS context across the case study areas.
Table 2 here
The more enlightening columns for our concerns here are the last three to the right. Taking each in turn, firstly, the percentage of HB claimants as a proportion of all PRS households is a crucial context in understanding the responses of landlords and hints at the alternative options, or not, available to them. For instance, in Westminster HB tenants in the PRS account for just 16 per cent of the total suggesting a relatively differentiated PRS (this is discussed in more detail below). In contrast, in RCT the PRS is dominated by tenants in receipt of HB, who account for a massive 60 per cent of all PRS households, and points to a more homogeneous social composition of the sector and a relative lack of alternative tenants (and alternative uses of their properties) for landlords. Secondly, house prices are an important consideration for landlord and tenant behaviour. The explosion in the Buy-to-Let market means that many landlords must command a certain rent in order to cover mortgage payments and accrue a profit. Furthermore, where prices are rising and where landlords are not in negative equity they are more likely to consider selling properties as a response to the reduced income from the LHA cuts: a more 12 Turnover in the PRS is also relatively high with 34 per cent of households moving within the last year. This compares to ten per cent in the social rented sector and just four per cent in owner-occupation (CLG, 2014). 14 feasible option in a buoyant housing market such as Westminster. In areas where house prices are high relative to wages LHA tenants are also more likely to face intense competition from suppressed homebuyers diverted to the PRS. Finally, the proportion of residents in the area on out-of-work benefits serves as a proxy for the relative health of the labour market and economic activity. Each of these differences, among many others, has a bearing on local rent levels. Table 3 (Hamnett, 2010) . The average rent for a two-bed property in Westminster was a massive £550 a week for instance, leaving LHA tenants with a shortfall of £260 per week post-implementation. In contrast, rents in RCT were already very low prior to the LHA reforms with little room for manoeuvre in terms of rent deflation, a desired policy goal of the reforms. Nevertheless, a reduction in LHA of £10 a week, or around £40 per month, for a one bedroom property in the Merthyr Cynon Broad Rental Market Area is a sizeable gap between the LHA rate and the contractual rent for anyone getting by on a low income. As noted, LHA reforms basically amount to reducing HB entitlements and therefore increasing the gap between average market rents and LHA entitlements to induce desired behaviours. This gap is far greater in Inner London than in other parts of the UK and the caps per bedroom size only come into play there at present (as shown in Table 3 ). That is, the 30 th percentile in some Broad
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Rental Market Areas in Inner London is higher than the caps per bedroom size; for everywhere else in the country the reverse is true.
Table 3 here
It is worth reiterating that the policies are anticipated to have the same impact across the country: a reduction in the HB Bill and downward pressure on rents; introducing "fairness" into the welfare system; and encouraging people into work. However, given the very different prereform contexts of RCT and Westminster it appears safe to assert that, at least to some extent, the reforms to LHA were devised by policy-makers with the increasingly globalized and gentrified London housing market in mind, with little consideration of the rental market in "low demand" areas like RCT. This is consistent with the stated policy goals of course: the overriding objective is to reduce the overall HB bill and in 2011 26 per cent of that bill was accounted for by London. The movement of LHA tenants from central London was therefore an explicit policy goal expressed in terms of "fairness": 'These changes will mean that people on benefit cannot choose to live in properties that would be out of the reach of most people in work' (DWP, 2010).
Indeed, extreme examples of relatively large households in receipt of LHA in central London were consistently used by government as a means of mobilising the disidentifications of "hard working families" (read middle-class voters) and garnering support for the reforms (see Slater, 2014) . The fact that a third of LHA claimants are already in work, rising to 40 per cent in London , is notable by its absence from that discourse. The potential impacts in low-rent, peripheral, deindustrialised spaces like RCT received little attention. A comparative analysis of Westminster and RCT is therefore particularly suited to understanding the consequences at opposite ends of the spectrum of UK housing markets. Given the dominance of London-centric discourses, such an analysis also highlights the neglected and significant consequences of the reforms for areas of 'dereliction wherein the precarized and stigmatized fractions of the postindustrial working class concentrate' (Wacquant, 2013a, p.9 ).
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The case of RCT also questions the dominance of the urban in studying the processes associated with neoliberal state-crafting. (Mennell & Goudsblom, 1998, p.240) These conceptualisations lead to the reification and dehumanization of social structures: society cannot be separated from the individual, or from human figurations, as 'social forces are in fact forces exerted by people over one another and over themselves' (Elias, 1978, p.17) . A figurational approach therefore emphasizes the interdependence of human beings whose lives are significantly shaped by the figurations that they form with others; these figurations are constantly changing in many ways -some fast, some slower and longer lasting; the long-term processual (or developmental) nature of figurations are unplanned and unforeseen; and the development of knowledge takes place within these figurations (Goudsblom, 1977) . Over the long-term 13 the increasing differentiation and specialization of social functions, under pressures of competition, results in an ever increasing number of interdependencies for the individual and groups as the webs of interdependence across societies grow. No-one controls the overall direction, rather social development is the outcome of figurational dynamics which are constantly in a state of flux as the power balances within them change alongside wider social transformations. The concept of figuration therefore 'directs attention towards shifting patterns, regularities, directions of change, tendencies and counter-tendencies, in webs of human relationships that are always changing over time' (Dunning and Hughes, 2013, p.52 ).
The PRS housing figuration
When we approach the PRS in this way it is not difficult to see that the state is but one social force acting upon the behaviour of tenants and landlords, who themselves are locked into a relationship of interdependence with each other, characterised by different power imbalances.
Even if we over-simplify the PRS figuration for our purposes here this fact becomes apparent.
For example, a tenant in receipt of LHA is locked into an interdependent relationship with: the wider household she forms part of; the state in the form of the LHA rules and level of payment; the local authority which administers LHA and interprets those rules; the landlord who, in theory, can decide to let to who she wants at what level rent she wants; and with other PRS tenants in direct competition for properties. This latter point is further accentuated by the expansion of Higher Education and increased international migration which have increased competition from students and migrant workers respectively. The deregulation, expansion and differentiation of the PRS have also increased the diversity of landlords operating within it.
Landlords are an extremely diverse bunch from "accidental landlords" (with one or two inherited properties) to letting agents to large-scale managing agents and overseas investors with sizeable property portfolios. Their responses to the LHA cuts are therefore shaped by their relative positions within the PRS figuration, with those responses in turn impacting on their tenants. Furthermore, the PRS figuration is shaped by its interdependence with other housing sectors. For example, the housing market crash in 2008 led to a huge increase in PRS demand from suppressed homebuyers unable to access mortgage finance, which served to intensify the competition for PRS properties for LHA tenants and conferred a relative shift in power to landlords in some areas of high demand. Similarly, the contraction of the social rented sector has placed greater pressures on the PRS as it is increasingly expected to absorb excess demand for social housing. These are just a few of the more obvious social interdependencies which impinge upon the ability of tenants and landlords to negotiate their way through an ever more complex, expansive and differentiated PRS figuration. The chains of interdependence go on and on (see Elias, 1978) . Seen in this perspective the simplicity of the stated aims of the LHA reforms appear absurd. It is therefore imperative that housing and urban scholars 'make reference to historical processes to uncover ideological assumptions behind policies that are presented as simple or "common-sense" solutions' (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013, p.41) . Or, in Elias's terms, an appreciation of long-term social processes and their development enables a shift to a more empirically-driven and reality-congruent fund of knowledge, as opposed to one that is ideologically-driven and statically orientated. A figurational approach also demands a focus on power relations and how these are shaped by longer-term, wider social processes; an approach that goes far beyond an acknowledgement that "context matters" by drawing attention to differential impacts across space, time and groups. It is relatively common for housing and urban scholars to fall into the same trap as the housing policies which they research and 'retreat into the present', neglecting the processual and developmental nature of society 14 (see Cole, 2006; Elias, 1987b; Flint and Powell, 2012; Rae, 2011) . 'Thinking in essentially static terms, we 14 I would suggest that the extensive empirical and theoretical work of Loїc Wacquant, and those influenced by him, represents a significant breakthrough for urban and housing studies in this regard. Though owing much of its development to the work of Wacquant's mentor and collaborator, Pierre Bourdieu, it shares a number of similarities with the "research-theorising" characteristic of Elias's figurational sociology (see Dunning and Hughes, 2013, pp.188-200; Rodger, 2012) . That is, Wacquant's work on the development of the urban form learns from the past, and is invariably empirical, theoretical, relational, historical, and sensitive to the sociology of knowledge (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992 ; see also Wacquant (2004b) for an engagement with Elias on the "dark ghetto").
are compelled to seek to identify the "active" or "prime mover", as well as the "moved", "acted upon" or passive "recipient" of "change"…questions which are themselves flawed in certain respects' (Dunning and Hughes, 2013, p.115 ). Elias's rejection of static concepts and insistence on the perpetual dynamism of human interdependencies acts as a particularly helpful theoretical tool in aiding an understanding of housing in flux.
It is not difficult to see that the static assumptions underpinning LHA reform, and their presentation as common-sense, are far from adequate. The LHA measures and their impact serve as a particularly illustrative example of neoliberal state-crafting due to the way in which central government is able to transfer the associated risks to tenants, landlords and local authorities (see also Blandy and Hunter, 2012) . Just as 'the genius of the Right to Buy was that…tenants themselves became the main agents of privatization' (odkinson et al, , p. , the perceived efficiency of the LHA reforms rests on the fact that, at least in the short-term, the state simply retreats while others respond; hopefully in the way that the government anticipates.
However, these policies of state retrenchment and the transfer of risk carry with them the potential for major housing and urban problems in the future as individual and household behaviours, enmeshed in complex figurations, inevitably produce undesirable consequences (Dunning and Hughes, 2013) . In this context welfare cuts to HB in the PRS can be seen to form part of the 'spread and normalization of social insecurity at the bottom of the class ladder' (Wacquant, 2013a, p.6) . It is to these consequences and their uneven geographical and social impact that we now turn.
20

LHA "reform" and its discontents
This section draws on evidence from qualitative interviews with landlords 15 and frontline housing advisers 16 , as well as four focus groups with the latter, in illustrating the complexities of landlord and tenant responses to the LHA reforms. 17 The research programme ran from April 2011 until May 2014 and involved different strands, but this section draws solely on the qualitative insights from those dealing with the fallout of the reforms (see Beatty et al., 2012 Beatty et al., , 2014 for a full account of the different research elements and the methods employed). 15 The landlord sample included landlords, letting agents and managing agents and these groups are not mutually exclusive. Where referring to the collective sample the term "landlords" is used. Where respondents are quoted their position of "landlord", or "letting agent", or "landlord and letting agent", is indicated. 16 The housing adviser sample contained a mix of representatives from the 19 local authority case studies in the research as well as those from the voluntary and community sector operating in those areas, such as the Citizens Advice Bureau, Crisis, Porchlight, Shelter etc. (see . Where referring to the collective, the generic term "advisers" is used. 17 For a detailed account of the research methods see Beatty et al., 2012 Beatty et al., , 2014 .
Marginalization in London
The PRS in the UK is incredibly diverse, notoriously unregulated and increasingly the only option for vulnerable and low income households who would have previously been housed in the social rented sector. Rapid PRS change presents problems for local authority housing departments, themselves undergoing severe cuts to staff and services, tasked with "regulating" the PRS but with less and less resources with which to do so:
"The community legal centre is overwhelmed with queries and problems from private rented tenants with everything from arrears, disrepairs to evictions and harassment from landlords…That's coupled with the fact that the private rented sector in Barking and Dagenham has increased from about 9% about six years ago to 17% now. We've got something like 12,000 private rented sector properties of which we're lucky if we know where , of them are…invisible (MOs 18 are growing in this borough"
(Barking and Dagenham adviser focus group) "It's so widely known the sector is completely unregulated and you can get away with anything. And the demand is so great and people will put up with almost anything" (Housing adviser, Brent)
The private sector is increasingly the destination for HB tenants due to processes of privatization and deregulation: through the shift from the regulation and bureaucratic management of social housing allocations, to the free market and open competition of the PRS.
Local housing market and migration processes are therefore fundamental in determining the relative position and power of LHA tenants and landlords within the PRS figuration. In Westminster, the balance of power is firmly in the hands of the landlord in terms of the response to the LHA reforms:
"Central London, this location is not reliant on only [Housing Benefit] tenants. There's all walks of life from all over the world coming to live here, to work here, study here…The attraction with the LHA tenant was a long term tenancy and they were paying slightly higher but then you were taking a lot of risks, responsibilities" (Westminster landlord) "It's very healthy, there's no shortage of tenants… privately or on housing benefit, but the housing benefit tenants tend to lose out" (Westminster landlord)
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The level of demand for rental property in the centre of a global city like London gives landlords the upper hand in terms of their relationship with existing LHA tenants: they are on the favourable side of an asymmetric power balance accentuated by the cuts. Tenants experiencing a significant shortfall between their contractual rent and their reduced LHA entitlement must find the income from other sources, reduce spending, move somewhere cheaper, or face eviction.
"What you've got now, no private landlord will rent to the DSS 19 , it's not economical" (Westminster landlord).
"Our outlook to housing benefit applicants has changed considerably…because they've been priced out of the market by the private tenants, the LHA is far less than what the property will achieve on the open market" (Barking and Dagenham landlord) "Yeah we've got rid of, we've basically changed our demographic, we've only got a handful of families left, it's been a massive change, and no under 35s, maybe one or two" (Westminster landlord and letting agent).
Landlords have no need to "take a risk" on LHA tenants, safe in the knowledge that demand from non-LHA tenants is so healthy. Continued financial deregulation since the 1980s means that housing markets 'are now deeply embedded within the international institutional architecture and financial flows' (Kennett et al., 2013, p.11) . The growth of the Buy-to-Let market in the UK bears testament to these processes, with new lending cases rising from 44,000 in 1999 to 346,000 in 2007 346,000 in (Kennet et al., 2013 ; trends mirrored in other countries exhibiting a growth in small-scale Buy-to-Let landlords such as France and Spain (see Crook and Kemp, 2014; Scanlon, 2011) . These globalisation processes ensure that global cities like London (and indeed Paris and Madrid) are seen as a "safe bet" for international investors looking to invest in property given the economic buoyancy of the city, high rates of economic activity, strong PRS demand among wealthy residents, and continued house price inflation. 20 A recent Report on overseas investment in London concluded: 'London property is now seen for many in terms of its investment potential, as a safe haven for cash in an unstable global climate, rather than something that should be meeting a basic social need for the capital's residents' (Green and Bentley, 2014, p.2) . This is certainly borne out by the process of marginalization experienced by many LHA tenants in central London. Given the huge shortfalls between LHA entitlements and rents, the impacts fall unevenly on: the tenant, who invariably has to find cheaper accommodation elsewhere and probably some distance from their current address, social networks, workplace etc.; and the local authority, which has to source ever more scarce (if not non-existent) suitable accommodation for an increasing number of evicted and often vulnerable tenants presenting as homeless. This accommodation is likely to be some distance from central London, and increasingly outside London altogether as outer London Boroughs feel the impact of displacement (i.e. less property available and higher rents), and inner boroughs are forced to discharge their housing duty. 21 Measured against other major global cities, for example, London prices look relatively cheap compared to Hong Kong' (Oliver, 2013, p.12) 21 For example, where tenants are evicted and present to the local authority as homeless, then the authority has a duty to find them "suitable" accommodation. Should, for instance, Brent Council be unable to find affordable accommodation within the Borough then they must look further afield. Increasingly, given the impact of LHA caps and the overall benefit cap, this accommodation is outside the Borough and sometimes London altogether (e.g. Luton, the Midlands, the North). If the tenant then refuses that accommodation, the Council can discharge its housing duty and no longer has any obligations to house that tenant.
") think in reality what's more likely to happen is that people…may end up making homeless applications or whatever, they'll be made an offer of private sector or temporary accommodation somewhere they don't want to go and they'll turn it down and we'll end up ceasing our duty to them for that reason" (Westminster Adviser Focus Group)
In general terms then, the Westminster landlord is faced with the inconvenience of replacing her LHA tenants with non-LHA tenants, while displaced households and the local authorities deal with the consequences. In some cases this is at great cost in the form of temporary and emergency accommodation, with families in bed and breakfast accommodation at a ten year high (Spurr, 2014) .
Across London, advisers spoke of the emergence and/or accentuation of processes of housing segmentation within London neighbourhoods. LHA claimants in central London are increasingly being channelled to specific areas of lower quality, cheaper PRS accommodation as much of the capital becomes unaffordable.
"It tends to be owners of tatty old property. They can't get decent tenants for what they have to offer so once again that sections the area, the cheaper area the landlords will [let to Housing benefit tenants], the better areas they just will not " (Barking and Dagenham letting agent)
"What we're starting to see in Brent though is some areas becoming almost no go for housing benefit tenants…So the borough's getting a bit split now into areas where landlords are willing to drop their rents down to the LHA level, accepting that they're generally going to have housing benefit tenants, and areas where landlords are pulling out of the market and just renting to people who are working" (Brent Housing Adviser)
In many cases, given the strong attachments to place within London and the positive function of particular ethnic enclaves (e.g. the Somali community in Brent), many households were "choosing" to overcrowd, thereby enabling them to remain within their current area.
Advisers and landlords invariably referred to the areas tenants were channelled to as the "bottom end" of the PRS, with many expressing concerns over "bad landlordism" and tenant exploitation. Given the webs of interdependence that characterise the PRS figuration these impacts go and on through the figurational chain. Although the channelling and marginalisation of LHA tenants is more marked and discernible in central London, these impacts are felt much further afield as displacement processes filter down through the housing system. The landlord below discusses the case of Jaywick in Tendring, Essex, a classic candidate for the processes associated with territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2007 (Wacquant, , 2008a . 22 These displacement and marginalisation processes were evident in Jaywick before the reforms but are accentuated further by them:
"I think Clacton changed, we'd gone away from being a nice seaside town, people still like to retire here but we've also had this deluge from some of the London boroughs where people have been placed down here in rented accommodation….more benefit claimants have moved down to the area and they have a policy now of moving these prisoners and their families into homes in Jaywick, it's a shanty town, wooden buildings" (Tendring landlord)
Many advisers spoke of this as the beginning of a longer-term process as the impact of the reforms works its way through the chains of interdependent power relations within the PRS figuration:
"I think the way it'll continue, if you put the city of London at the centre, everything will just, it just ripples on, so you move to there, a year later you'll move on, a year later move on " (Barking and Dagenham Adviser Focus Group) Ultimately this contributes to the gentrification of an over-heated London housing market (see Lees et al., 2010 , Watt, 2009 , driven by an economy dramatically out of kilter with the rest of the UK (Harvey, 2013) , as LHA tenants are replaced by wealthier households, not just in central London but further out:
"Hackney advertises itself as this trendy fashion hub and a media centre and it's attracting lots of young professionals who can't buy or don't want to buy cos it's a stepping stone to somewhere else, so you've got the conflict of the local population and Hackney bringing in lots of money, they can pay council tax but they take up the accommodation that the sons and daughters of the indigenous population can't compete with" (Hackney Adviser Focus Group)
A telling reminder of the neoliberal roots of these processes can be found in the fact that, ironically, LHA tenants are often channelled to ex-Council properties. These have ended up in the hands of landlords as a result of the Right to Buy policy who, in turn, benefit financially from the current lack of social housing.
"I think where our properties are I've got a certain kind of clientele, they're all ex-council properties, Oxgangs, Fir Hill" (Edinburgh landlord)
As well as advisers many London landlords were also acutely aware of the ongoing and negative processes of gentrification and marginalization, neatly captured by the interviewee below.
"Capping [is the biggest impact], you don't want ghettos. You want people to live in the community where all walks of life would be living, otherwise we have something like what some parts of France has where it's all snooty nosed people there…there'll be quite a divide" Westminster landlord).
Advanced marginality in RCT
The nature of the PRS figuration in RCT differs markedly. Average house prices in the district are just £107,000 (around a tenth of that in Westminster) and are significantly lower than the equivalent figure in other areas where LHA tenants predominate. Globalisation there has led to deindustrialisation, selective out-migration, housing residualisation, economic and social dedifferentiation and marginalisation. These processes contribute in turn to territorial stigmatisation, which carries with it psychological consequences as 'the spatial denigration of neighbourhoods of relegation affects the subjectivity and the social ties of their residents as well as the state policies that mould them' (Wacquant, 2013b, p.12) . Landlords within the area, many of whom are heavily dependent on LHA claimants for their lets, cannot help but be influenced by 27 this powerful stigmatizing force, which informs their interpretation of the LHA reforms, their attitudes to tenants, and the perceived consequences for their rental properties:
"I think a lot of landlords are afraid to rent out at the moment, worried about conditions on properties, the upkeep, the expense to them and I think they're also afraid they could get stung" (RCT letting agent) "I've turned away every LHA claimant that's come knocking, so for the last three months we've been marketing it, haven't let anyone in there who's not fit" (RCT landlord).
Thus, territorial stigmatisation has implications for landlord behaviour as well as that of policy elites detailed by others (see Wacquant, 2007; Slater and Anderson, 2012) . In much of RCT the housing stock is a legacy of the coalmining industry which once dominated the landscape (a further example of the neglect of historical social processes in the "design" of the reforms). The impact of the Shared Accommodation Rate changes have resulted in an explosion in demand for rooms within shared properties. Territorial stigmatisation counters against the assumed "market adjustment", of landlords converting properties to shared accommodation, as landlords expressed an aversion to Housing of Multiple Occupation. A stigmatized housing form within a stigmatized area:
"As you know in the Rhondda [the stock is] very small two and three bed accommodation…But (MOs, it would be a brave man to put them on the Rhondda anyway" (RCT landlord).
Housing of Multiple Occupation aside, although the stigmatization of LHA tenants is fairly consistent across the UK, the landlord aversion to them in places such as RCT does not necessarily mean they will not let to them. In many cases they have little choice. Unlike
Westminster, the figurational dynamics of tenant-landlord interdependence in RCT are more equal with landlords there in a much less powerful position than their central London counterparts. The relative lack of social differentiation and the absence of alternative PRS submarkets (e.g. large numbers of students or migrant workers) and property uses within parts of RCT mean landlords are more dependent on LHA tenants, and by extension the state, for their rental income (Crisp, 2013) . The housing market is also markedly different, but just as Westminster landlords claim that the LHA market is economically unviable, so too do RCT landlords. The difference being that the impact must be absorbed by RCT landlords in the absence of alternative tenants.
"You can't sell stuff up there, it's not a seller's market, 100 [of the portfolio] are ours and the rest are other people's, we're all in the same boat, people aren't buying up there…what we've found with the housing benefit rates now, they're dropping so rapidly it's become uneconomic really" (RCT landlord) Landlords in RCT, unable to alter their letting strategies, must adjust in other ways. They bemoaned the "unfairness" of a policy they saw as London focussed and London made. They cited the marginal differential in running costs between RCT and other parts of the UK, yet the impact of the shift to the 30 th percentile was applied to all areas regardless of pre-reform rent levels (see Table 3 above). Landlords were left with no choice but to cut back on maintenance and repairs as they struggled to make ends meet:
"If I don't make any money there's no money for maintenance and you're just papering over cracks" (RCT landlord) "The other problem is properties fall into disrepair…and that becomes a really difficult problem for landlords, bad landlords: not a problem" (RCT landlord)
The inevitable outcome was a gradual deterioration in the quality of housing and the living conditions of tenants. In some cases, very low LHA rates coupled with negative experiences of arrears, property damage and absconding tenants meant that landlords were more inclined to leave properties empty. Figures for 2012/13 show that RCT contained 2,480 empty homes, a massive 12 per cent of the total for the whole of Wales. 23 RCT was not immune to the globalisation of housing investment, but outcomes for investors here were far removed from those in Westminster:
"…it's very difficult when the rent levels are going down…you're getting more and more vacant property…) think a lot of people bought from outside the area at auction, they can't really manage it being so far away, thought it was a great deal, now the market's dropped off they can't really sell them or don't want to sell them" (RCT landlord)
Leaving properties empty was also an emerging tactic in other "areas of relegation" where LHA tenants predominate, such as the coastal district of Thanet in Kent:
"All of us have got properties that have been empty for months…about per cent of the market in Thanet (are LHA claimants), particularly in Cliftonville, is housing benefit. And the current housing benefit is nowhere near what the rented properties are; the difference is too big for the tenants to be able to afford the top up" (Letting agent, Thanet) 24 One common process in both RCT and Westminster is that of the spatial marginalization of LHA tenants as they are channelled to specific areas. The context however, is markedly different.
Within RCT there are two different Broad Rental Market Areas (see Table 3 The LHA cuts had contributed to this process by concentrating greater numbers of HB tenants in those areas of territorial stigmatization. Though unconsidered and unforeseen by central government policy-makers, the local knowledge of the adviser meant that they were seen as inevitable from her point of view: "It's shifting the people that could potentially, who were able to claim prior, further up the Valleys to cheaper areas…as soon as it was announced we knew that was what was going to happen" RCT Housing adviser)
As the adviser below notes, these consequences of the ill-thought-through LHA cuts were acting against decades of regeneration efforts (RCT was previously designated an EU Objective One area) in dealing with the fallout of deindustrialisation, economic decline and marginalization.
"The European Union are trying to put all this funding in to promote and bring higher standards into certain areas, into deprived areas, and we're just pushing the people on the lowest income back into those areas because that's the only places they can afford" (RCT Housing Adviser).
Perhaps counter-intuitively then, over the long term, LHA reform has a more detrimental impact on landlords in RCT than it does in Westminster. Similarly, the impact on the area of RCTalready marginalized and stigmatized -is far more severe than that in Westminster, in terms of housing quality and conditions and its contribution to the process of marginalization and territorial stigmatisation. Ultimately, over the long-term, the prospects for RCT look decidedly bleaker than that of Westminster. The impacts in Westminster will be felt by displaced tenants in the immediacy, but the fallout is essentially diverted elsewhere (e.g. Barking and Dagenham, Thanet, Jaywick etc.) as a product of the particular PRS housing figuration which confers significant power to the landlord.
Neoliberal housing policy and its deleterious consequences
The immediate fallout of the LHA reforms in Westminster impinges on claimants. LHA cuts could not have come at a worse time for these tenants. Massive foreign investment in the London PRS driving up rents, coupled with intensive competition from suppressed homebuyers unable to access mortgage finance, means that LHA tenants are pushed further to the back of the housing queue and displaced to marginal locations within London and beyond. This displacement, and by extension gentrification, process is an explicit goal of the reforms (as detailed above) and therefore adds to existing evidence on 'state-sponsored gentrification' 31 (Allen, 2008; Uitermark, 2014; Watt, 2009) . The reduction in HB entitlements also contributes to the poverty of tenants as an intended outcome assumed to encourage unemployed tenants into work . In this sense, these outcomes would seem to support the notion that 'in contemporary Britain it makes sense to speak of a broken state not simply as a hyperbolic counterpoint to the "broken society", but because the state is making a steady switch from a remedial to a generative force in respect of marginality, inequality and precarity' (Slater, 2013, p. 12 -emphasis in original).
In both Westminster and RCT, however, the different knock-on effects discussed above also manifest in a deepening of marginalization. They testify to the inadequacy of the simplistic, static, ideology-driven policy assumptions characteristic of neoliberal governance, which appear absurd given the complexity and diversity of PRS figurations across space, which are in a constant state of flux. They are triggered by state policy but they are outcomes of social interdependencies and unequal power relations which characterise the PRS in particular localities. For example, in Westminster they impact on tenants to a much greater degree; whereas in RCT they impact significantly on landlords and tenants. At the same time, in some areas where the PRS figuration and housing context is more suited to the reforms, the policy appears to have been relatively "successful" (see Beatty et al., 2014) . The range of consequences discussed here can be seen as a result of short-term and reactive policy design informed by social misdiagnosis and driven by ideological (involved) thinking which partakes in a 'wilful institutional ignorance' (Slater, 2013) -the government's presentation of the assumed responses of tenants and landlords have been shown to be inherently flawed due to the neglect of the social processes and interdependencies in which they are embedded.
LHA reform provides a telling example of Wacquant's neoliberal state-crafting: the state retreats and cedes "control" to the (PRS) market which results in deleterious effects; with the governmental presentation of welfare reform, of its aims and impacts differing markedly from experiences on the ground. Lack of regulation of the PRS alongside rapid tenure shifts means an increasingly crucial, and growing, portion of the housing sector is effectively unmanaged. The deteriorating "bottom end" of the PRS, marginalized and increasingly concentrated in areas of relegation, is the destination for growing numbers of vulnerable households, who are more often than not the least powerful groups within the PRS housing figuration, and society more generally. Placing social processes at the centre of our understanding enables a clearer view of these marginalized neighbourhoods as 'time-stamped configurations whose conditions of genesis, development, and eventual decay are sustained and undermined by distinct configurations of state and citizenship' (Wacquant, 2013a, p.8) . In this sense, evidence presented here supports the notion that western European states have retreated to a position of management rather than remedy, which has emerged as a key rationality of neoliberal governance (Rodger, 2012; Slater, 2013 , Uitermark, 2014 . One in which 'the organization of urban space plays a pivotal role…as the stigmatized poor are removed from zones of affluence and forced into areas of relegation' (Uitermark, 2014 (Uitermark, , p.1419 ).
In the case of London, it could be argued that these neighbourhoods could be classified as emerging "anti-ghettos" (Wacquant, 2008b) : porous and ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, characterised by internal division and undergoing a process of relegation as a result of state policy (Wacquant, 2008a (Wacquant, , 2008b . As Slater and Anderson (2012) note with reference to St Paul's in Bristol, the taint of stigma actually informs policy: 'the reputational ghetto in fact constitutes the undercurrent of local urban policy' (Slater and Anderson, 2012, p.541) . In contrast to places like St Paul's and Hackney however, which can be seen from above as suitable for gentrification (Slater and Anderson, 2012) , other already "relegated" areas -on the periphery, isolated from the centres of economic activity and "unattractive" to private investment, such as RCT -can be viewed as spaces of advanced marginality (Wacquant, 2007 (Wacquant, , 2008a . Spaces merely for containing HB tenants and low income households; isolated and excluded from labour market opportunities since the onset of deindustrialisation. Indeed, the relative ethnic homogeneity of RCT, its lack of internal division and its non-urban context suggest it does not fit the conceptualisation of the "anti-ghetto" in Wacquant's schema (2004a Wacquant's schema ( , 2008a Wacquant's schema ( , 2008b . RCT, and other deindustrialised areas in Europe like it, would appear to be outliers worthy of further scholarly attention in contributing to and refining Wacquant's comparative and relational framework.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that LHA reform is indeed a generative force of marginality, inequality and precarity (Slater, 2013) for individuals and groups at the bottom of the class structure.
Many of the negative consequences of the LHA reforms can be seen as the product of short-term policies driven by ideological knowledge of a utopian bent that envisages market-based "solutions" based on flawed (static) assumptions (see Chang, 2010) . The gulf between the simplistic governmental presentation of, and rationale for, the LHA cuts -deficit reduction, fairness and work incentives -and the complexity and reality of consequences on the ground is striking. As Elias noted, economists and politicians 'act as if they know the answers on the basis of ideals' (Elias, 1994, p.48 -emphasis added) . Yet, reforming the PRS is clearly fraught with difficulty. Its diversity, dynamism, complexity and unregulated nature make it difficult to grasp and understand; and impossibly so when approached via an ahistorical, static orientation.
Indeed, its marginal position in the housing system means that we are so far from a sufficient understanding of how the PRS "works" that anticipating how policy decisions will impact further down the chain of social interdependencies of a sector constantly in flux is a fruitless endeavour. The PRS figuration would seem to support the notion that:
'At this early stage current levels of knowledge are perhaps only sufficient for sociologists to draw upon in calling into question, for example, fundamental assumptions made within policy discourse' (Dunning and Hughes, 2013, p.48) This paper has attempted to do just that and has shown that the policy assumptions underpinning LHA reform are inherently flawed and contradictory. Of course, the history of social aid to remediate poverty is replete with undesirable consequences for the lower strata of society it is supposed to assist. Bronislaw Geremek's (1994) detailed account of attempts at alleviating poverty in the Middle Ages testifies to the ubiquity of undesired outcomes associated with European social policy from its earliest incarnation. This history also informs of similarities in the shape of: the ambivalent position of the poor in the eyes of society; the ubiquitous uncertainty and precarity that characterises life for those on the margins; and the ineffectiveness of ideology-driven knowledge and policy, albeit that emanating from the Church in that period. But similarities in terms of the impact on the urban form are perhaps most resonant for our concerns here:
'Most striking, however, was the social division of the city's topography into rich and poor. It was concentric: the closer a family lived to the religious and economic centre of the city, the higher its position. The price of land was dictated by this arrangement, by which means, of course, the system was protected and maintained' (Geremek, 1994, p.69) 500 years on these spatial and social processes continue within central London. Though the policies of the neoliberal period are not as overtly hostile and repressive as previous eras in their spatial containment of those at the bottom of the class structure the outcomes are remarkably similar (Geremek, 1994; Van Wel, 1992; Wacquant, 2004a) . The poor are marginalized by policies that purport to help and are stigmatized for their marginal position in a self-perpetuating circularity that informs policy (Wacquant, 2007; Slater and Anderson, 2012; Tyler, 2013 ). Elias's historically-informed work can contribute here through providing the theoretical tools with which to challenge and expose the "present-centred" myths which inform urban and housing policy. And the testing of Elias's theories, hitherto neglected by urban and housing scholars, could likewise contribute to their development, extension, synthesis and refinement.
